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Propositions relating to the dissertation Residence in Tax Treaties by Francisco 
Sepúlveda 
 
1. A fully domestic definition of residence in tax treaties implies that the dividing line 
between good faith and bad faith is left to domestic tax policy considerations (Chapter 2, at 
pp.27-31). 
  
2. Effective double taxation is not required for a tax treaty to operate under the ordinary 
meaning of the term 'liable to tax'. The sovereign right not to tax is a fundamental piece of 
the treaty bargain (Chapter 8, at pp.112-115). 
  
3. Fully transparent entities are not ‘liable to tax’ under the provisions of the Model (Chapter 
4, at p.50). 
  
4. The interpretation of Art.4 OECD MC by the OECD in 1992 (conduit companies) and 
2008 (dual residents) is meant to lay down standards, which the provisions of the domestic 
laws on residence have to fulfil in order that claims for full tax liability can be accepted 
between the Contracting States (Chapter 7, at pp.94-96).  
  
5. Tax liability represents more a political than an economic allegiance. The place where 
economic activities are carried out or income is generated is irrelevant for the purposes of 
granting access to the benefits of tax treaties (Chapter 10, at pp.161-262). 
  
6. The rules on tax treaty access contribute to the difficulties in identifying the object and 
purpose of tax treaties (Chapter 9, at pp.137-140). 
  
7. The issue of base erosion and profit shifting is caused by the lack of equilibrium between 
residence and source taxation. 
  
8. From an international tax law (BEPS) perspective, there are no tax treaty benefits that are 
universally and indisputable unintended (Chapter 10, at pp.152-156). 
  
9. The purpose of the Commentaries to the OECD MC is to create the broadest possible 
policy background for the application of the Model, to make sure that any State may use the 
provisions of the Model when negotiating tax treaties. This introduces uncertainty and thus 
reduces significantly their relevance as an instrument of tax treaty interpretation (at pp.129-
131; at pp.222-225). 
 
